Psychoanalysis and the Criminal Law by Silving, Helen
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 51
Issue 1 May-June Article 4
Summer 1960
Psychoanalysis and the Criminal Law
Helen Silving
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Helen Silving, Psychoanalysis and the Criminal Law, 51 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 19 (1960-1961)
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
HELEN SILVLNG*
Professor Silving is a Professor of the University of Puerto Rico. However, she is at present on,
leave from the University while serving as Adviser to the Legislative Penal Reform Commission of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Previously, Professor Silving was associated with the law
faculties of Harvard and Yale.
This article presents an assessment of the impact of psychology upon two important areas of
criminal law, (1) the problem of "responsibility" and (2) the question of what types of conduct
should be treated as criminal. Professor Silving points out that psychoanalytic findings cast new
light upon many of the assumptions, methods and goals of criminal law, and that many of these
findings can be utilized to improve the criminal law. She notes as well, however, that wholesale in-
corporation of ideas contributed by psychoanalysis would be highly undesirable in the criminal
law, which must reflect the concern of a democratic society for individual liberties. Caution must be
exercised, therefore, in evaluating the potential effect upon important individual freedoms of policies
which appear desirable when considered only in the light of psychiatric discoveries. She concludes
that the teachings of psychoanalysis have much to contribute to the criminal law when they are
thoughtfully weighed and selectively chosen on the basis of their consistency with the fundamental
aims of a constitutional, democratic society.
The author prepared this article at the special request of the Board of Editors in commemoration
of the Journal's fifty years of publication.-EDroR.
The most significant contribution of psycho-
analysis to the understanding of mental processes
is discovery of unconscious mental life. The so-
called "Unconscious" follows its own laws. Within
the system "conscious," unconscious contents ap-
pear "irrational." Since there is "communication"
between the "Conscious" and the "Unconscious,"
such "irrational" contents, of which man is un-
aware and over which he has no control, intervene
in his thoughts, decisions and actions and thus
exercise an influence upon his life. In the light of
this discovery, man no longer appears to be a
wholly "rational being."
This new "image of man" has given a distinctive
imprint to contemporary culture, just as various
other historical "man's images" have influenced
and reflected particular cultures.' As each of these
has shaped legal reality, so "man's image" as
conceived by psychoanalysis today has a growing
impact upon legal development. It increasingly in-
* The views expressed in this article are exclusively
those of the author. They do not reflect the opinions of
the Penal Reform Commission.
Perhaps no single Biblical thought has summarized
Judaeo-Christian philosophy as adequately or de-
termined its cultural impact as effectively as the idea
of man's creation "in the image of God." Other repre-
sentative "images of man" of distinctive cultures are
Luther's "free Christian man," Rousseau's man "born
free," the "economic man" and the "rational man."
fluences legal thought indirectly through a variety
of channels, such as general and legal philosophy,
ethics, and changes in social mores, as well as
directly through the new knowledge of mental life
which it conveys. It throws a new light on "man"
in the various capacities in which he functions in
law: as law creator and enforcer, as addressee of
legal norms and as object of law enforcement.
Space limitations do not permit a comprehensive
evaluation of the impact of psychoanalysis upon
all phases of jurisprudence and criminal law. The
following discussion is thus necessarily selective.
Basic methodological issues are treated only inci-
dentally. Problems of the bearing of psychoanalysis
on legal philosophy and ethics affecting criminal
law cannot receive the full consideration they de-
serve, and inquiry into the significant problem of
the influence of psychoanalysis on development of
pertinent constitutional concepts must be omitted.
I shall confine myself to a discussion of the impact
of psychoanalysis on substantive criminal law, that
is, on the two fundamental problems which it
presents, that of "responsibility" and that of
appropriate selection of conduct to be proscribed.
In each context, I shall point out the limitations
upon a full realization of psychoanalytic insight in




"Responsibility" is a moral or legal rather than
a scientific concept. It is best defined as the con-
nection adopted in ethics or in law between certain
conditions, such as certain mental and external
factual data (e.g., intent or negligence and death
causation), and certain consequences, such as
social censure, imprisonment, fine, compensation.
Decision makers shape these conditions and conse-
quences for legal purposes with a view to achieving
their preferred goals, the so-called "ends of criminal
law." As stated by Dean Paul K. Ryu, responsi-
bility is a "relational concept."' 2 This means that
there is no absolute concept, state or quality of
"responsibility." The conditions and consequences
constituting "responsibility" are not each a sepa-
rate phenomenon or occurrence suspended in the
air or a quality inherent in the individual. Rather,
to each type of condition or conditions complex
there is assigned by law a particular type of conse-
quence or a group of consequence types. In a ra-
tional system of law this assignment is based on
rational considerations, so that the conditions and
consequences are geared to each other in a sound
manner. Such rationality is judged from the stand-
point of the goals which operation of the responsi-
bility concept is expected to reach. The choice of
"ends," as well as of the conditions and conse-
quences which are to serve the chosen ends, is in
large measure limited in democratic society by
constitutional restrictions aimed at preservation of
fundamental rights of men.
This definition of "responsibility" suggests not
only the sphere of potential contribution of psycho-
analysis, as a science, that is, psychoanalytic psy-
chology, to the shaping of a legal concept of re-
sponsibility but also the limitations imposed upon
such a contribution. Psychoanalytic insight may be
brought to bear on the elements of rational
teleology implied in a sound system of responsi-
bility. But it cannot resolve the normative prob-
lems of choice, the choice of goals or of their proper
hierarchy, except perhaps indirectly by bringing to
the attention of decision makers the manner in
which pursuit of a given goal would operate.
Finally, as the goals themselves, considerations of
scientific teleology also must yield to constitutional
limitations, so that a method which is most ap-
propriate scientifically may often have to be
sacrificed to fundamental liberties.
2
PAUL K. Ryu, KOREAN CULTURE AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY (Yale Thesis, 1958, on file in the
Library of Yale Law School).
Problems of "responsibility," though closely
connected with each other, may be divided for
purposes of presentation, into three topics: (1) the
goals or "ends of criminal law"; (2) the conse-
quences of responsibility or "sanctions"; and
(3) the personal conditions of responsibility or
"imputation." 3
(1) The "Ends of Criminal Law"
The misunderstanding between lawyers and
psychiatrists, abundantly discussed in the litera-
tures of both law and psychiatry, begins at the
stage of "ends" to be pursued. It is thus important
to clarify further the methodological problem in
issue. Treatment of specific "ends," retribution,
reformation, community protection, etc., will be
omitted.
The "ends of criminal law" are ethical, political
and social ideals, that is, they are normative and
not scientific conceptions. The choice of normative
ends-provided that they do not involve dedica-
tion to an abstract purpose at any cost-to be
"rational" should take account of pertinent facts,
particularly those bearing on the questions of
whether a given end can be reached and, if so,
what is the cost of reaching it. But a normative
choice, adoption or rejection of an "end" as a
"value," cannot be made by a simple application
of reason to facts, for values neither rationally flow
from facts nor are automatically invalidated by
facts. The function of science in the process of
choice lies in its use as a tool, a fact-finding instru-
ment, where facts have been normatively decided
to be pertinent. Thus, in considering adoption of
an end, decision makers may take account of the
fact-finding of psychoanalytic psychology that
conscious pursuit of that end may be impeded by
unconscious judicial and public motivations at
variance with those consciously professed. The
decision makers may or may not decide that the
mere fact of a goal being psychologically rooted in
or impeded by a motive deemed objectionable does
not nullify its value. This is itself a matter of
normative decision. If they decide that the value is
not thus ipso facto nullified, they should further
consider, in the light of science, whether it is pos-
sible by judicial and public education to eliminate
or modify the operation of the impeding uncon-
scious forces. The decision makers may make final
decision regarding adoption or rejection of the goal
3 To be accurate, the objective parts of definitions of
crime and the tests of ascertaining the presence of
objective crime elements also form part of the "re-
sponsibility" concept.
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dependent on the answer to this question. But the
ultimate decision upon adoption or rejection of an
"end" must be theirs, for it is a normative decision.
It is thus fallacious to assume that the "ends of
criminal law" can simply be logically derived from
scientific findings of psychoanalytic psychology re-
garding the motives which prompt man's actions
and reactions. But this is precisely the method
which has often been used in the numerous law
reform proposals advanced in recent decades. Fre-
quently, what appears to be a conflict between the
legal and the "scientific" approach is in fact a con-
flict between legal and medical ethics. Confusion
may be avoided by clarity regarding the exact
line of demarcation between scientific finding and
ethical choice. An example may illustrate the
manner in which separation of the "scientific" from
the "ethical" aspects of choice should be main-
tained.
The first issue before decision makers entrusted
with formulation of criminal law policy is choice of
a basic ethical approach. That choice may or may
not be made without regard to any factual or
scientific information. The problem of whether the
dominant ethics should be absolute or utilitarian
ethics is implied in all discussions concerning
"ends"; however, this problem is never verbalized
in this country,4 utilitarianism being tacitly as-
sumed to be a self-evident approach even by those
professing adherence to various religious views.5
The psychoanalytic information that may or may
not be regarded as pertinent to the choice between
absolute and utilitarian ethics concerns the roots of
ethical principles. Psychoanalysis has traced the
preferred symbols of absolute ethics to psychologi-
cal origins in motives traditionally identified with
vices. Self-sacrifice, altruism, generosity, absolute
truthfulness have been shown to originate in un-
4 Contrast with this approach the elaborate discus-
sion of the type of prevailing ethics by the Bundes-
gerichtshof of the German Federal Republic. Decision
of the Bundesgerichtshof (Great Senate in Criminal
Matters), February 17, 1954, 6 B.G.H.St. 46 (1954),
holding that the question of whether sexual intercourse
between flanc~s constitutes "lewd conduct" within
the meaning of §§ 180, 181, Penal Code (Pandering),
must be determined by objective ethical norms and
not by either community standards or community
mores. For criticism of this decision see Bockelmann,
Zur Strafbarkeit der Kuppelei, JuRis'nscyE RmmscHAu
361-364 (1954); Jescheck, Zur Frage der' K-uppelei
gegenf~ber Verlobten, MONATSSCmur' Fet DE uTscHEs
RECr 645-649 (1954).
5 Another problem which decision makers may have
to face is whether it is proper for them, in a democratic
country adhering to the principle of separation of
state and church, to apply their religious preferences
to law. Such separation, of course, does not necessarily
imply adoption of utilitarian ethics.
conscious processes governed by the "pleasure-
pain" principle and often grow out of motives that
are diametrically opposed to the noble sentiments
apparent to the bearer himself as well as to others.
Of course, psychoanalysis, as a science, does not
avow any particular ethical preference. Its own
operational concepts, the "reality principle," the
"superego," incorporate the idea of modification of
the "pleasure-pain" principle. Psychoanalytic
writers disclaim that any inference as to the value
of ethical principles may be drawn from their
origins. But the fact is that whether or not such
inference may or should be drawn is itself a norma-
tive ethical rather than scientific problem. Within
this context, it may or may not be pertinent to
note that absolute ethical ideals, by definition, defy
"proof" or "disproof" by reference to origins.
To arrive at a "rational" system of ends, it is
necessary to view the pertinent facts and factors
in context with each other rather than treat each
as an isolated phenomenon. When this method is
applied, it will appear that utilization of psycho-
analytic knowledge in law presents a distinctive
problem not to be equated with that obtaining in
other fields. An example may illustrate the point.
While, as suggested above, e.g., retribution6 is not
necessarily eliminated as an "end of criminal law"
on the sole ground that--as has been shown by
psychoanalytic writers-it is psychologically
rooted in vengeance, awareness of such motivation
may be most pertinent to its choice as an "end."
Psychoanalytic insight into such motivation con-
stitutes an important contribution to law. But in
legal context the inquiry must be extended to other
pertinent factors. For instance, one might inquire
to what extent a defendant who is the victim of
judicial "vengeance" disguised as "retribution"
may obtain legal relief. The law possesses various
tools of control aimed at prevention of mob justice
and judicial error. Appellate judges who may never
face the accused perhaps do not identify them-,
selves with him in the same degree as a trial judge.
It may be worth exploring whether the psycho-
logical relationship of appellate judges to the trial
judge may not have a stronger impact on their
decision than their relationship to the accused. It
Modem "retribution," though rooted in "venge-
ance," cannot be simply identified with vengeance.
Its meaning and function in modem law will be dis-
cussed in a separate paper.7 On this, see Reik, Gesidndniszwang und Straf-
bedarfnis, in PhOBLEs DER PSYCaOANALYSE UND DER
K i.tUOLOGIE 146 (1925); ALExANDER & STAu33,
T)E CRIIAL, T=E JUDGE, AD r Pusu~c 218
(rev. ed. 1956); RBwALD, SociErv AND iTs CiR=,ALs
202 (transl. T. E. James 1950).
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is important to remember that historically the
trial judge was the "accused" on appeal, for
judicial review grew out of a "trial" of trial judges.
Legal "justice" cannot be fully equated with indi-
vidual or family justice.
The choice of both ends and means in a demo-
cratic society must always remain subject to
limitations imposed by the demands for preserva-
tion of fundamental political and ethical principles.
In evaluating an "end of criminal law," it is thus
essential to visualize the effect of its realization
upon individual liberties. For instance, while there
can be no serious dispute over the desirability of a
policy of reformation and treatment, advocated by
many psychiatrists, account should be taken, in
following this policy, of the political effects of an
extreme treatment-oriented policy. A by-productof
such policy has been extension of the notion of the
State as parens patriae into the criminal law for
adults. Psychiatrists often equate the State with a
"parent"-a just, unjust, loving or hating parent.
8
Of course, such equation presumably purports to
describe particular reactions of neurotic offenders
to the State. No objection can be raised against the
equation so long as it is confined to such descrip-
tion of neurotic reactions. But it is dangerous to
extend it further by creating a general, presumably
ideal, image of the State as a "good parent" or of a
judge as a "just father." When carried over into
political or legal ideology, the equation tends to
support a distorted, "paternalistic," totalitarian
ideal of State in the minds of men. Mature, free-
dom-loving men neither deify nor personify the
State. They look upon it critically as a utilitarian
device, an instrument serving accomplishment of
certain limited and well-defined community ends.
But it may be difficult to maintain this democratic
impersonal concept of State when an altogether
different anthropomorphic picture of State is used
in "treatment" context. Though the psychiatrists'
demand for treatment of offenders is meritorious,
policy makers must never lose sight of the fact that
treatment imposed upon law breakers under State
authority cannot be equated with a medical task,
as generally conceived.
8 See, e. g., Watson, A Critique of the Legal Approach
to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW AND CONTEIU'. PROB.
611, 627 (1958). And see Guttmacher, The Psychiatric
Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAw A") CON-
TEpr. PROB. 633, 647 (1958), opposing preemption of
the judicial function by psychiatrists on the ground that
the judge as a "father figure" is "worthy of preserva-
tion by society."
(2) The Consequences of Responsibility: Sanctions
As we reach the problem of appropriate means
toward the chosen goals, the potential contribution
of psychoanalytic knowledge to law gains ground.
But in this area there is greater disagreement
among psychiatrists than in the area of goal
determination. Some psychiatrists would like to
see punishment entirely abolished and offenders
classified by psychiatrists, not by judges, into two
groups, those who should be treated and those who
should be confined indefinitely.9 Others would
admit application of punishment to special groups
of offenders for reformative or deterrent purposes.
0
The wisdom of granting psychiatrists a broad
discretion in exercising judgment as regards con-
finement of a nonpsychotic offender for the re-
mainder of his life, regardless of the crime for which
he has been convicted, has been questioned." But
our law itself is making increasing concessions to
the spokesmen of the law's "sister sciences" for a
greater measure of control over disposition and
treatment of offenders. Within the scope of the
relatively indeterminate sentence device, there is
appearing upon the legal scene the board of ex-
perts, replacing the court as sentencing authority
and endowed with discretion in manipulating treat-
ment methods and with power of extending at any
time (within the maximum set by law) the term of
sentence.12 The new trend raises considerable
doubts in the minds of those who believe that
man's freedom-not completely forfeited by con-
viction-is better safeguarded where the sentencing
power is more narrowly limited by law and wielded
by independent judges who are used to thinking in
terms of legal categories of jurisdiction, limitation
of power and due process, than where such power
is broadly defined and exercised by an administra-
tive body composed of men who by training and
profession are oriented to welfare rather than to
social freedom. The sex psychopath laws, which
9 See, e. g., KARL A. MENNINGER, TIHE HUmAN
Mnm 448-49 (3d ed. 1945); ZILBOoRG, THE Psy-
CHOLOGY OF THr CRIinwAL AcT AND PuNIsHMENT
(1954).
10 Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal
Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1952); ALEx-
ANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 210-211.
"See Wertham, Book Review (of ZirLBOORG, op.
cit. supra, note 9), 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1955);
also Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, id. at 336
(1955). Compare also a sociologist's critique, Hakeem,
A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and
Correction, 23 LAW AND CO--=M?. PROB. 650 (1958).
12 See particularly the California Adult Authority,
§ § 5075-5094, California Penal Code, West's Annotated
California Codes (1956), as amended.
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deliver .into the hands of experts for an indefinite
time even minor sex offenders often not convicted
of any crime, seem to frighten the experts them-
selves."
There is practical unanimity on the superior
merits of psychiatric and educational treatment-
provided that it can be used in a given case-, as
compared with imprisonment. Of course, the
essence of a sanction lies in its involuntary nature,
and psychiatric treatment practiced on a com-
pulsory basis presents certain fundamental diffi-
culties. Since it may produce profound changes in a
man's personality, it is perhaps a more serious
intervention into his private sphere than is im-
prisonment. Moreover, from a psychiatric point of
view, many believe that a compulsory treatment
promises no success.' 4 Our law has devised an
ingenious method of reaching a compromise so-
lution between theschemeof imprisomnentand the
alternative of treatment: probation, which permits
the judge to make treatment a condition of pro-
bation. Moreover, in England, wisely, probation
requires the prisoner's consent,15 and the draft of a
new German Penal Code singles out psychiatric
treatment as a condition of probation which can-
not be imposed without consent of the proba-
tioner.'
Psychoanalytic writers have called attention to
certain specific problems raised by the unconscious
reactions of various offender types to conventional
criminal law methods. In this area psychoanalytic
findings have been most instructive in showing
that several of these methods often promote the
very factors that lead to crime. Psychoanalysts
have dramatically described the manner in which
"the criminal from a sense of guilt" unconsciously
schemes to achieve being punished. He does that in
order to secure atonement for an imaginary crime
of childhood and to attach his guilt feelings for
"3 See KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFENDER AND His
OFrENSES 233-34 (1957).
14 On this problem see BITISH JOURNAL OF MEDICAL
PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 17 (1938). Among sociologists
opposing treatment on an involuntary basis, see
BARNES & TEETERs, NEw HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY
592 (3d ed. 1959).
5 Criminal Justice Act, 1948, s. 3 (11 & 12 Geo.
c. 53). On the therapeutic value of consent, see Clifford,
The Role of Probation in the Treatmenwt of Offenders,
Tm Roos OF CrA 120, 122 (East ed. 1954).
1' The reason advanced for adoption of this rule is
that treatment cannot be fruitfully applied on an
involuntary basis. See ENwuR DES ALGESEINEN
TEIlS EmES STRAFGESETZBUCHS (Verlag des Bundes-
anzeigers 1958), § 78(2), and comment at p. 79.
such non-existent crime to something real.17 In
this scheme, law enforcement agencies, believed to
assist in the maintenance of the legal order,
actually serve as unwitting tools of the offender.
Psychoanalysts have pointed out that imprison-
ment, which places the offender in a position of
utter childlike dependence on guidance, frequently
promotes the very infantile drives, the imma-
turity, from which the crime arose. They have
called attention to the fact that harshness as a
response to crime waves, generally believed to act
as a powerful deterrent factor, actually tends to in-
crease criminality, for excessive punishment, in
doing violence to the offender's "sense of justice,"
which in his Unconscious takes the form of a lex
talionis, is interpreted by him as advance payment
for future violations, a credit on future crime.
8
It should be interesting to secure the expert
opinion of psychoanalysts on the impact of the in-
security element in the indeterminate sentence
upon the reformation process of the offender.19
The most constructive contribution of psycho-
analysis to reformative penology is discovery of the
psychoanalytic method of treatment, which makes
it possible to reach certain types of offenders who
are not accessible to conventional therapeutic
methods, that is, neurotic offenders.'0 Psycho-
analytic writers have shown that recidivism, es-
pecially stigmatized by law, does not automatically
indicate greater depravity of the offender but
indeed points to a greater likelihood of mental ab-
normality than does casual criminality.2' Where
recidivism is "an intrinsic part or natural phase of
17 Freud, Der Verbrecher as Schuldbewusstsein,
X GESAmmELTE ScmuFTEN, Internationaler Psy-
choanalytischer Verlag 312.
18 ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra, note 7, at
54; MIRA Y L6PEZ, MANUA DE PSICOLOGf& JURfDIcA
91 (4th rev. ed. 1954).
19 In recommending such sentences, Professor Glueck
stressed the fact that indeterminateness itself is a
deterrent. Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational
Penal Code, 41 HAv. L. R1v. 453 (1928). It is not
quite clear in what manner or upon whom this de-
terrence is expected to operate.
20BERNARD GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 197-220 (1933).
211bid.; see also Glover, Prognosis or Prediction:
A Psychiatric Examination of the Concept of 'Recidi-
visit', 6 BRITs JoURNAL oF DELINQUENCY 116
(1955-56); compare also Conclusions of Section III
of the Tmnn INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON CammuoL-
OGy, London, 12th-18th September 1955, in Stumx
OF PROCEEDINGS, published by the British Organizing
Committee (1957) at 221, recognizing that "mental
disease and abnormal personality traits play a much
greater part in recidivism, and especially in grave and
persistent recidivism, than in casual criminals."
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... disease,"' - conventional reactions to recurrence
of crime, such as automatic aggravation, revoca-
tion of probation and incidental interruption of
treatment, appear unreasonable. While the grave
problem of recidivism cannot be regarded as re-
solved, a foundation has been laid for careful re-
examination of this legal category.
(3) Personal Conditions of Responsibility: "Impu-
lation"1
In addition to the objective elements of crime,
responsibility in the sense of amenability to sanc-
tions requires the presence of certain subjective
psychological factors: states of mind, as appearing
in definitions of crimes, and a general mental apti-
tude of the offender. The former are known as
"intent" and "negligence," the latter is called
"'mental capacity." The new image of man which
psychoanalysis has introduced into contemporary
culture sheds new light on both factors.
Formerly, man's personality was compart-
mentalized into various distinct and separate
sections-reason, will, emotions-and each of his
acts constituted an independent event solely con-
nected with a particular mental episode specifically
bearing upon it. Psychoanalysis has shown that
this picture of man's personality and of his be-
havior is fallacious. In its light, man's reason, will
and emotions are inter-connected. Specific con-
scious expressions of any of these elements are
never the sole determinants of his conduct. Rather,
there is accumulated in man's Unconscious the
total history of his life experience dating back to
his infancy. The contents of the Unconscious pene-
trate his conscious life expressions; conversely, his
Unconscious is influenced by his conscious experi-
ences. The conscious present and the unconscious
life history of man are combined in his personality,
which constitutes an indivisible dynamic unit.
Each of man's acts emanates from his unitary total
personality rather than from a single autonomous
state of his mind.
In the following I shall attempt to show how this
new interpretation of mental life affects the legal
doctrines of the "psychological factors of crime"
and of "mental capacity."
22 Glover, supra, note 21, at 122.
23 "Imputation" is ascription of responsibility for
an event to an individual. This term, as used in the
criminal law doctrine in civil law countries, is normally
predicated upon the objective occurrence of the event,
causation by the individual, and a certain mental
attitude of the individual (who must be "imputable,"
that is mentally capable to be a fit object of imputa-
tion) toward the act or its consequences.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF CRIME
"Intent"
The law proceeds on the assumption that any
given "intentional" act is ascribable to a particular
"intent," which psychologically appears as an iso-
lated event or at least as an event separable from
other psychological phenomena. It thus singles out
from the dynamic continuity of a human life one
act and a particular intent directed toward it or
toward its consequences. Inquiry into the total
personality development which culminated in the
particular act in issue, indeed even into the specific
motive which produced the intent to carry out the
act, is barred.2 Our law further assumes that if the
intent is not a spontaneous growth but instead
follows a certain pattern of continuity, then it is
ipso facto more reprehensible, "premeditation" in-
variably adding to the wickedness of intent.
The modem psychological conception of each
human act as emanation of man's total personality
-which is a dynamic, historically developed unit-
makes the "isolated intent-act" position appear
highly unrealistic. Nor does "premeditation" as
conceived by law in itself present a distinctive
psychological category; often it is not discernible
from intent. Psychological differences rather appear
in the motives of action. Hence, there is noticeable
an increasing demand for recognition of the signifi-
cance of "motive" in law. But "motive," as known
in psychology and psychiatry, has a broader con-
notation than is attributed to this term in juris-
prudence. In the latter discipline, as in everyday
life, "motive" consists of the conscious reasons-or
"rationalizations"-which are believed to produce
the intent to commit the act. In modern psychiatry,
on the other hand, motive is at least partly un-
conscious and is not a detached phenomenon but
rather part of a continuous process of evolution.
25
It is doubtful that a proper assessment of such
"profound" motive by psychoanalytic methods is
feasible within the framework of legal procedures
for the establishment of "responsibility." 2 In any
event, the legality principle, which is a most im-
portant safeguard of liberty, bars assigning to
"motive" in its full psychological sense the place it
24 Motive has only evidentiary value, except where
it is made a part of the definition of a crime.
5 KARL A. MENNINGER, THE HuMAN MIND, op.
cit. supra, note 9, at 446.
26 Theoretically, profound motives may be considered
today within the procedures of sentencing and execu-
tion. But it is doubtful that these procedures can be
developed in such manner as to permit the technique
of a significant profound analysis to function within
their framework.
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deserves on scientific grounds. Crime, that is, both
its external and its psychological elements, must be
definitely described in abstract terms in advance of
its commission, lest a defendant be placed at the
mercy of the arbitrariness of his judgesY Pro-
found, unique, untypifiable motives do not lend
themselves to be made part of abstract definitions
of crime. This means that such motives may be
considered at the trial stage only within the con-
text of "mental capacity."23 Conscious "motives"
have gained ground in substantive definitions of
crime, particularly in the law of homicide, as well
as in the general area of mitigation grounds, in
civil law countries, "premeditation" receding in
importance or being entirely eliminated. 3
"Negligence"
The conventional legal concept of "negligence"
presents a most interesting psychological phe-
nomenon. In it, conscious and unconscious factors
are not differentiated for legal purposes. That
which "ought to be known" is deemed equivalent
to that which "is known." Advertent and inad-
vertent negligence are treated alike. It appears as
though the law anticipated the concept of "un-
conscious knowledge." Indeed, inadvertent as well
as advertent negligence have been traditionally
classified as "states of mind," which is justifiable
only in the light of psychoanalytic doctrine."0
Significantly, the need for a clear differentiation of
advertent and inadvertent negligence appears to
be increasingly felt precisely as psychoanalytic
knowledge is brought to the attention of lawyers.3'
The question has been posed whether it is just
to punish a man for conduct the risk of which has
7The legality principle is an essential of the "rule
of law," guaranteeing the security and peace of mind
of citizens. Its importance must not be underrated
precisely in the light of psychoanalytic knowledge.
28 The dubious aspects of the differential treatment
of the trial and sentencing stages in our law and the
questionable features of a personality oriented criminal
law will be discussed in a separate paper.
On this see Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Com-
parative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 350, 360-
368 (1954).
30 Some writers deny that negligence is a "state of
mind." On this see Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence,
and Indifference, 39 HAiv. L. REv. 849, 852 (1926).
3"The concept of "negligence" presents special
difficulties within the scope of Welzel's celebrated
"teleological action doctrine." According to this
doctrine, the fault of the negligent actor lies precisely
in his failure (omission) to "direct his conduct teleologi-
cally" as required by law. WELZEL, DAs DEurzscm
STa. --Avci 32, 110 (6th ed. 1958). While Wezel
apparently has not been influenced by psychoanalytic
thought, his doctrine of the essential unity of psy-
chological and external elements of crime meets in
part certian psychoanalytic findings.
never entered his conscious mind. Alexander and
Staub suggested that since there is communication
between the Conscious and the Unconscious, a
threat of punishment for inadvertent negligence
may, through the medium of man's Conscious,
enter his Unconscious and deter dangerous acts by
bringing the danger to his unconscious knowledge. 3
This utilitarian consideration does not dispose of
the moral issue presented by punishment of con-
duct not consciously "known" to be dangerous.
Differentiation in law of negligent conduct de-
pending on presence or absence of consciousness
of risk is essential. Only when committed in aware-
ness of risk can an act be blameworthy and hence
deserve punishment. However, the law cannot
disregard the danger inherent in conduct express-
ing an unconscious tendency to produce harm.
The proper solution seems to lie in a differentiation
of the sanctions to be imposed into those expressing
censure and those aimed at correction. This solu-
tion may be fitted into a scheme for isolation and
differentiation of sanctions first devised by Carl
Stoos" and incorporated in the 1893 Project of a
Swiss Penal Code. The scheme, known under the
technical name "dual-track system" (Zweispurig-
keit), has since been adopted by numerous civil
law countries." It realizes a special type of "rela-
tional responsibility."-" Punishment is imposed
upon those "guilty" of censurable conduct, whereas
"security measures" are applied for preventive
2
2ALEXANDER & STAuB, op. cit. supra, note 7, at
79, 129-131.
3 See Exposg des Motifs de l'Avant Projet de 1893
(Basel-Geneva 1893). See also SToos, DER KAMP
GEGEN DAS VERB1EEHEN (1894); Die sichernden
Massnalimen im Entwurf zu elnem Scrweizerischen
Strafgesetzbuck, 17 ScmwslzEuscuE ZErrscmR= FUR
STRAPREcHT 380 (1904). For further citations see
JihulNEZ DE ASUA, Las Penas y las medidas de seguridad,
in 2 EL CtauNALISTA, (2d series) 175, note 4 at 178
(1958).
"Swiss Federal Penal Code, 1937; Italian Penal
Code, 1930; German Penal Code, as amended in 1933,
present text of Sept. 1, 1953. For further examples see
Scn6NKE, STRAFGESETZBUCH, Ko m NTAR 127-128
(7th rev. ed. Schr6der 1954). The "European penal
reform movement" which promoted the "dual-track
system" first focused on the fight against recidivism
and habitual criminality. As indicated above, this
area of law requires careful reexamination. The dual-
track system, however, generally represents the idea
that punishment is a proper sanction for those "re-
sponsible," whereas measures are appropriate for those
not "responsible" but dangerous to themselves or
others, e.g., those acquitted on the ground of insanity
and alcoholics who have committed crime. For citation
of international congresses which discussed the subject
see SCH6NKE, supra, 127-128; also Jim9NEZ DE AsfiA,
op. cit. supra, note 33.




and protective purposes to those whose conduct,
though not censurable, is dangerous.36 I believe
that such a scheme may be used to advantage to
stress the significant difference that exists between
advertent and inadvertent "criminal" conduct.
Only advertent negligence should be punished.
Those who breach the law inadvertently should
be subject to measures of education and cure not
involving moral censure but directed and limited
to furthering advertence of danger.? It is important
to add that "measures" in a democratic country
can be imposed only where the harm resulting from
inadvertence is serious; moreover, such "measures"
must be administered by judges pursuant to re-
quirements of the "rule of law."' '
From this evaluation of inadvertent negligence
follows a need for reassessment of the legal treat-
ment of "crimes aggravated by the result."
These are crimes in which the consequences exceed
in gravity those intended by the offender. In order
to prevent punishing the offender for consequences
not attributable to his "guilt," Germany amended
her Penal Code so as not to hold the actor re-
sponsible for unintended consequences unless he
brought them about "at least negligently." 9
Here, as generally in the law of negligence, no
distinction is drawn between advertent and in-
advertent negligence. The policy implicit in the
above stated position indicates that the German
rule should be modified to make the actor puni-
tively responsible only for those consequences
which he brought about at least by advertent
negligence.
36The draftsmen of the Project of a German Penal
Code believe that a pure law of "guilt" can be main-
tained only where there is a separate system of "meas-
ures." See ENTWURF DES ALLGEME"NEN TEins ENIES
STRAFGESETZBUCHS, op. cit. supra, note 16, at 84.
17 The measures suggested here for inadvertent
negligence resulting in harm are psychoanalytically
oriented education and, if consistent with the actor's
freedom to accept or reject treatment, also treatment.
Methods of inducing acceptance of treatment short
of actual punitive coercion are, e.g., withdrawal of a
license of an inadvertently careless driver. On desira-
bility of corrective treatment rather than punishment
in cases of inadvertent negligence see HALL, PRINCIPLES
or CRx NA LAW 245-46 (1947).
38 Application of special legality rules to measures
is an important feature of the recognition of their
distinctiveness in civil law countries. Contrast with
this approach our American method of non-differential
treatment of punishment and measures, which has
resulted in indiscriminate administrative application
of "measures," presenting a serious danger to individual
liberty.
11 § 56, German Penal Code, added Aug. 25, 1953
(text of Sept. 1, 1953, B. G. BI. pt. I, at 1083). For
translation of the provision see Silving, Euthanasia,
supra, note 29, at 361.
The law draws a distinction between "negli-
gence" and "accident." Some penal codes of civil
law countries, indeed, expressly exclude responsi-
bility for "accident"-"caso fortuito,"'' "mero
accidente."4' A Spanish commentator significantly
notices that, the incidents of responsibility being
enumerated in the penal code, such express exemp-
tion of situations in no way comprised in the
enumeration would seem superfluous, as is express
exemption today of responsibility of animals or
for death by lightning.42 But the fact is that the
"fortuitous case" or "mere accident" is felt not
to be clearly distinguishable from "negligence,"
and the history of the distinction, as the same
commentator remarks, is marked by an "absolute
confusionism." Psychoanalysis may help to reduce
the significance of the distinction to functional
limits. In its light, a human act which causes harm
is seldom "accidental"; however consciously
"unintended" by the actor, the harm may have
been "intended" by him unconsciously. Thus,
"accident" shades into inadvertent negligence.
Even death by lightning may be unconsciously
intended.? Psychoanalysts have hence suggested
that the "accidental actor" be held responsible. 4
No psychoanalytically oriented lawyer can object
to some form of legal reaction to "accidental"
conduct where the harm caused is a very serious
one. An "accidental" killer prima facie presents a
dear and present danger to his fellow men, and
it is certainly not more excessive to demand that
he cooperate in an attempt at avoiding future
fatal accidents than it is to require a person to
submit to vaccination or to a quarantine. But, as
in the case of the inadvertently negligent actor,
"responsibility" should imply no moral censure
but consist of a "measure of security and cure"
and be confined to such intervention as is neces-
sary to accomplish the curative and safety purpose.
Differentiation in inadvertent conduct between
"negligent" and "accidental" acts is, nevertheless,
justified. Traditionally, the former are marked by
a high degree of risk and foreseeability of harm.
4
40 Art. 45, Italian Penal Code.
41 Art. 8(80), Spanish Penal Code.
421 QuiNTANo RxpoLms, ComnrmNnRIos AL CODIGO
PENAL 123 (1946).4
3 This example, used by BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY
TEXTBOOK Or PSYCHOANALYSIS 150-151 (1955), is
singularly responsive to Ripolles' query, supra, note
42.
"4 ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra, note 7, at
130.
45 The standard of foreseeability and care in criminal
negligence cases is fairer to the defendant in, e.g.,
the German law than it is in our law. That standard
is both subjective and objective, the individual not
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In the case of an act resulting in serious harm, the
difference between inadvertent negligence and
accident will be given effect within the context of
the choice of the measure to be applied. Also to
be considered is further limitation of the scope
of applicability of measures where the act is
"accidental" rather than inadvertently negligent,
e.g., measures might be used in "accident" cases
only where the "accident" results in death or seri-
ous bodily harm.
MENTAL CAPACITY: "IMPUTABILITY"
The problem of defining "mental capacity" has
been the object of a vigorous controversy in which
lawyers, psychiatrists and sociologists have re-
cently participated. The debate has advanced on
two levels. The issue on one level has been the
proper test for exempting an accused from re-
sponsibility on the ground of mental incapacity.
The issue on the second level has been a proposal
advanced by a group of psychiatrists that every-
one, whether or not mentally sane, be held "re-
sponsible" for the consequences of his acts,
"responsibility" meaning amenability to psychi-
atric treatment or indefinite confinement; this
would render formulation of any test unnecessary.
"The Mental Capacity Test"
The debate over the first mentioned issue has
focused on the so-called McNaghten rules46 which
hold an accused not responsibile if, due to mental
disease, he did not know "the nature and quality
of his act" or that it was "wrong." Psychiatrists
have challenged this test on the ground that it
proceeds from a now outmoded view of the human
mind as functioning in distinct parts or sections,
reasoning being separated from volition and feel-
ing. This "faculty-psychology" approach-they
say-is incompatible with the now prevailing
concept of man's unitary personality.
Under the influence of such psychiatric criticism,
on both sides of the Atlantic new rules were formu-
lated. In Spain a Law Revision Commission under
the chairmanship of the author of PsicoAkisIs
CRIMINAL,47 Luis Jim6nez de Asfia, accepted a
being held responsible beyond a measure of care of
which he was personally capable, as well as in excess
of such measure if his personal capacity exceeds that
of the average citizen. See MAYRAcH, DEuTscHEs
STmRxEcHT, ALLGEMEINER TEiL 491-492 (1954).
S6 McNaghten's Case, 10 C1. & F. 200, 8 E.R. 718
[1843].
47 JnItz DE AS6A, PScOANALISIS CRnaNAL
(1940).
formula suggested by a psychiatrist member of
the commission, Dr. Jos6 Sanchis Banifs.4s The
Spanish test exempts from responsibility simply
"the alienated" (enajenado), adding "a person
who is in a state of temporary mental disturbance"
(el que se halla en situaci6& de trastorno mental
transitario).4 The ground advanced for choice of
the one word test, "entajenado," derived from the
common language rather than from scientific
vocabulary, ° was the commission's desire to
avoid involvement in problems of controversial and
changing nosology.51
In the United States, Judge Bazelon formulated
the celebrated Durham rule, 52 which defines mental
incapacity exempting from criminal responsibility
simply as "mental disease or defect," adding as a
qualifying factor the so-called "product-test":
the mental disease or defect affords an exemption
only if the act was "the product" of the disease or
defect. It may be advisable to dispose first of the
"product" aspect of the Durham test, for this
aspect could be easily eliminated, as suggested by
the Spanish rule. The "product" test, undoubtedly
derived from "the offspring or product" test of
the New Hampshire rule,-" formulated at a time
when "faculty psychology" was still dominant, 4
is based on the notion of that psychology that a
human act is the product not of one's entire per-
sonality but of particular personality portions
separable from others. As correctly pointed out by
judge Biggs, this test "will only lead to the fallacies
of monomania if the courts permit it."51
Criticism of both the Spanish and the Durham
tests must rather focus on the main concepts of
these tests. Before commenting upon them, it
might be useful to state what precisely is the
issue to be resolved by a test. The law is not con-
cerned with the medical definition of "insanity"
48 See JmfmEz DE AStA, LA LEY Y EL DELITO,
PaINcirios DE DEREcHO PENAL 371, 378 (2d ed. 1954).
49 Art. 8, subdiv. 1, present Spanish Penal Code
(1944).
50 The scientific term is rather "alienado."
51 IMNEZ DE AStIA, LA LET Y EL DEL1IO, op.
cit. supra, note 48, at 371.52 Durham v. United States,' 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
63 State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369 (1871). The basic
distinction between Durham and the New Hampshire
rules lies in the fact that the framers of the latter
believed that "mental disease" eliminates "intent,"
whereas this belief is no longer valid today. Of course,
absence of intent specifies the meaning of "mental
disease" and thus affords a functional limitation of the
test as well as a rationale for its adoption.
4 See OVERHOLSER, TlE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE
LAw 22 (1953).
55 BIGGs, THE GurLTY MIND 155 (1955).
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or of "mental disease."'56 It is concerned with the
moral or social convenience issue
57 of deciding
what mental qualities or states of mind "should,"
as a matter of sound policy, exculpate an offender.
The McNaghten rules were formulated on the
Biblical assumption-perhaps unconscious at the
time of McNaghten's Case--that error of fact
or of law exculpates because it removes an essential
element of crime, disobedience to law.N The case
expresses a definite policy, which, of course, is
too narrow to meet present-day requirements. But
a test now as then should provide an operational
tool for a chosen policy. Neither the Spanish nor
the Durham test satisfies this requirement.
To say that a "mentally ill" person is not re-
sponsible, and then, only, pose the question
wherein mental disease consists and what qualities
it comprises, begs the issue.H Such statement is
not a substantive policy disposition but a delega-
tion of power.6 The basic objections to such dele-
516 Glover, Isolating a Group of Delinquent Disorders,
1 BRITISH JOURNAL OF DELINQUENCY 109 (1950).
'7 Whether morality or social convenience is assumed
as a policy standard depends on the basic approach to
ethics adopted by a given legal system.
H, See Ryu & Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative
Study, 24 U. Cm, L. REv. 421, 430 (1957). That it was
the policy of McNaghten to exempt from responsibility
those engaged in legal and factual error and not those
simply mentally ill becomes clear when the case is
studied in historical perspective. That mental disease
itself exculpates is the result of a long evolution of
law. Historically, the mentally ill were not exempt
from punishment. Perhaps the main reason for the
law's failure to recognize mental disease as a ground of
immunity is the fact that the Bible, which has in-
fluenced our criminal law throughout the formative
period of its history, far from looking upon such
disease as an incapacity, indeed regards it as a source
of visionary, prophetic inspiration. Balaam was a
"closed-eyed man"; his eyes opened and he "perceived
the sight of the Almighty" only after "he fell down."
Numbers 24, 3, 4. He was obviously an epileptic.
Compare also Hosea 9, 7. Freud's showing of the
correspondence of opposites (Totem and Taboo, in
THE BASIC WRTINGs OF SIGmuND FREUD (Brill
transl. & ed. 1938) 807, at 858-9), affords a basis for
assuming that it is this Biblical conception of insanity
as a Divine gift which we find reflected in the medieval
notion of mental disease as possession by demons. But
error of fact and of law was deemed in the Bible to
excuse non-observance of law, and it is this exemption
that was preserved in the limited form of error based
on mental disease constituting a defense.
59 "Disease" is not a medically or psychiatrically
well defined concept. As pointed out by East, Legal
and Medical Advances in Criminology, in THM ROOTS
OF CRIME, op. cit. supra, note 15, 1, at 5, "Many books
on general medicine, psychiatry and psychology omit
'disease' from their indexes."
60 This is shown by In re Rosenfield, 157 Fed. Supp.
18 (D.D.C. 1957), reversed and remanded sub nom.
Rosenfield v. Overholser, 262 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
gation of power are political-possibly also con-
stitutional--ones. It affords no assurance of equal
treatment and leaves abundant room for arbitrari-
ness of those on whom determination of the
presence of mental disease in concrete cases de-
pends. The substantive issue not being decided,
neither can an adequate answer be expected re-
garding the rationale of the exemption.
If it is deemed preferable not to leave the policy
decision on the scope of exemption from responsi-
bility ultimately to individual psychiatric experts,
a legal definition of mental incapacity must be
formulated in such a manner as to indicate that
scope. If the concept of "mental disease" is to
play a significant role in the exemption clause, it is
important to note that there is disagreement
among the different psychiatric schools of thought
on the meaning and scope of this concept. 6' This
implies that the law must choose between the
divergent psychiatric approaches and follow a
definite psychiatric school of thought. Should the
chosen doctrine be psychoanalytic, the definition
would have to be shaped in the light of the funda-
mental psychoanalytic tenet of the relativity of
mental health and mental disease. According to
psychoanalytic doctrine, there are present in every
man's mind, the healthy as well as the ill, contra-
dictory forces struggling for supremacy, conflicts
between the ego, the id and the superego. Mental
health consists in a balance of these forces, a suc-
cessful resolution of these conflicts, and mental
disease consists in a disturbance of such balance,
failure to resolve a conflict. The disease area is
thus broad, and the borderline between illness and
health is tenuous. 62
Adoption by law of the psychoanalytic definition
of mental disease as a test of exemption would
imply concession of a rather comprehensive scope
61 There is no controversy today regarding desirability
of exempting from responsibility all persons suffering
from severe mental diseases, the so-called "psychoses."
The McNaghten rules are inadequate to supply a
basis for affording an exemption even to all such persons.
The differentiation between "significant knowledge"
of right and wrong and "insignificant knowledge"
is not a precise standard of exemption. There is no
indication in the light of what science or discipline
"significance" of knowledge is to be judged. In the case
of a psychotic offender, it would seem unnecessary to
inquire into the question of whether the act was a
product of the disease, even if such question were
scientifically answerable.
62 On the nature of psychiatric diagnoses, see Ovxs-
HOLSER, op. cit. supra, note 54, at 25; Brancale, Diag-
nostic Techniques in Aid of Sentencing, 23 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 442, 445 (1958); MACDONALD, PSY-
CHIATRY AND TIE CRIMNAL LAW 65 (1958).
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of exemption.6 But "mental disease," without
further qualification, is not a necessary test of
exemption. Many psychoanalysts might, on psychi-
atric grounds, not favor exemption from responsi-
bility of all those whom they include in the
category of the "mentally diseased." Assuming
that the psychoanalytic interpretation of mental
life is accepted by law as scientifically sound,
psychoanalysts should be consulted on the problem
of rational selection of the groups to be exempted.
In fact, suggestions for narrowing the scope of the
psychoanalytic "mental disease" definition by
adding a qualifying clause for use in a legal in-
capacity test are already available. The Group for
Advancement of Psychiatry has suggested adop-
tion of the civil committability test. 4 This sug-
gestion, however, merely shifts the issue to another
area in which there is considerable uncertainty. A
test advanced by Bromberg and Cleckley offers a
distinct improvement. It poses the question of
mental incapacity in the following terms: Was the
function of the accused's "ego so impaired that
he could not, because of genuine disability, act
within the limits of social demands and rules?"6 5
Yet, the phrases, "could not" and "genuine dis-
ability," would seem to be rather vague. The
former might also lend itself to being nullified by
deterministically oriented psychiatrists. Perhaps,
since the very essence of the psychoanalytic view
of mental illness lies in its relativity, the test should
also be couched in comparative terms: Was the
accused's ego so impaired that he was very con-
siderably less than the majority of the people
within the community 6 capable of conforming to
social demands and rules?" Both tests would prob-
ably satisfy those concerned with the moral issue
of responsibility. Presumably, anyone asked for a
6 The problem of qualification as an expert would
present a major issue.
64 Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert
Testimony, Report No. 26 (May 1954) of the Committee
on Psychiatry and Law of the Group for the Advance-
ment of Psychiatry.
65 Bromberg and Cleckley, The Medico-Legal Di-
lenmma, A Suggested Solution, 42 J. C=u. L., C. &
P.S. 729, 744 (1952). The authors also put the ques-
tion differently: whether the accused's "total personality
(i.e., the ego), was impaired by mental disease to a
degree rendering him unable to adjust to society's
rules."
6 It would be necessary, of course, to include in the
penal code a definition of the term "community."
67 The danger of exempting too large a group of
persons from responsibility might be to some extent
obviated if the same test were used for releasing those
acquitted on the ground of insanity from mental
hospitals.
common-sense reason for exempting a mentally ill
person from responsibility would answer: "Because
a mentally ill person cannot help acting as he does,
in a manner comparable to that in which you and
I can help acting as we do." The moral ground of
the exemption is not the disease but the ensuing
incapacity, 6s and the disease merely functions
as a device of typifying and proving incapacity.
"Responsibility as Amenability to Treatment"
As pointed out above, our contemporary moral
standards suggest a policy of not holding a man
punitively responsible for an act he could not help
committing. But a number of psychoanalysts
believe that the psychoanalytic discovery of the
operations of the Unconscious has proved the
existence of a complete "psychic determinism," in
the light of which all human thoughts, decisions
and actions are referable to causes, so that man
never possesses freedom of either choice or action.
However, a man who cannot thus help committing
crime presents a danger to his fellow men. Since
society must be protected, it has been proposed by
several psychoanalysts that all persons who commit
crime, whether mentally ill or healthy, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or
unconsciously, be held "responsible," responsi-
bility however meaning not punishment but
amenability to treatment in accordance with
personality differences to be established by psychi-
atrists.69 This raises the second issue which, of
course, is by no means new in recent history,
having been thoroughly debated when contentions
of a similar nature were advanced by the positivist
school of criminal law.
The argument thus advanced proceeds from a
misconceived notion of causation and the policy
advocated is politically dangerous. To be sure,
psychoanalysis has closed many gaps of our pre-
vious knowledge of causation. It has supplied
causal explanations for mental phenomena which
were hitherto unexplainable, by tracing them back
to unconscious sources. Although its causal ex-
68It may be interesting to note that Jim~nez de
Asfia, under whose chairmanship the Spanish test
was formulated, does not himself approve of this test.
He suggests the following formula: The following
persons are not responsible (not imputable): "the
alienated and the person in a state of temporary
mental disturbance, when he cannot discern the illegal
nature of his acts or inhibit his criminal impulses."
See LA LEY Y EL DELIrO, op. cit. supra, note 48, at
377.
69 See e.g., KARL MENmGER, TniE HuAr MiND
448-49 (3d ed. 1945); ZMBOORG, op. cit., supra, note 9.
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planations have been chiefly concerned with
phenomena hitherto ascribed to "accident"
(parapraxes and dreams), it has also shown that
our conscious decisions and actions may be referred
to unconscious motivations. From this the in-
ference has been drawn that what we subjectively
experience as "choice" of courses of action is in
reality predetermined by such motivations. Thus,
though belief in free will may serve as a useful
too70 for educational or therapeutic purposes, it is
in fact, in the opinion of many psychoanalysts,
but a figment of man's imagination.
This argument is not convincing. The histories
of theology and philosophy are replete with alle-
gations of universal causation,7' and the problem
of reconciling determinism of human conduct with
free will is at least as old as the doctrine of the
origins of sin and of Satan's godly descent. It was
certainly raised when God abstained from destroy-
ing man on the ground that "the structure of
man's heart is evil since his childhood. 7 2 It is
neither possible nor necessary in the present
context to trace the history of the notion of causa-
tion as it developed from the time of this Biblical
pronouncement until our age of science and
psychology. With the emergence of new sciences
of man, the "sister sciences" of the law, the prob-
lem of causation must be viewed in the first place
methodologically. It is not permissible to transfer
notions of causation from mathematical sciences
to the so-called "sciences of man," for the methods
of verification in the latter are vastly different
from and less accurate than those available in the
former. 3 One might give further thought to the
70 Knight, Determinism, Freedom and Psychotherapy,
9 PS-CnxiTR 251-262, at 251 (1946).
71 It may be pertinent to note that KELSEN, SocIETY
AND) NATURE (1943), has shown the idea of "causation"
to have originated in the legal notion of retribution
and, throughout its history in science and philosophy,
to have developed in close analogy to jurisprudential
changes.
7 Genesis 8, 21. The passage in the King James
version reads: "the imagination of man's heart is evil
from his youth." But "yezer" (translated as "imagina-
tion") cannot be adequately translated. It is used as
"yezer hatov" and "yezer harah," a "good" and an
"evil" "yezer." It is "creation," "creature," "product,"
"structure," even temptation or urge. "Neurim"
(translated as "youth") is man's "childhood" as well
as his youth.
73It may be interesting to note that Max Planck,
who showed an extremely keen interest in the problem
of "free will," found evidence of its existence in the
rather pessimistic observation that, while it is possible
to predict objectively the conduct of other men, it is
not possible to predict one's own conduct without at
the same time influencing such conduct by self-observa-
precise import of the "proof" allegedly adduced
by psychoanalysis of the inexistence of free will.
In this discipline, proof consists mainly of psycho-
logical experiences, e.g., the experience of a cure or
a recollection, and such experiences are not quali-
tatively different from the allegedly sham experi-
ence of free choice. 4 Many thoughtful analysts
treat "psychic determinism" as a hypothesis.
7 5
That such hypothesis is a necessary operational
tool of psychological research and psychiatric
treatment cannot be doubted. But to draw from
it any inferences applicable also in law and ethics
is entirely unwarranted. In any event, assuming
the deterministic hypothesis to be applicable out-
side of the spheres of psychology and psychiatry,
it could afford no basis for any ethical proposition
-even a utilitarian one--that might in turn
serve as a hypothesis for society's "right" to
intervene in man's life, either punitively or in the
form of treatment. Determinism can at best sup-
port the ethical nihilism expressed in the judicial
statement to a prisoner: "You could not help




However, exclusion of the issue of determinism
does not dispose of the problem of the desirability
of accepting the psychiatrists' proposal for re-
placing retributive imprisonment by reformative
treatment and in the case of the unreformable by
preventive indefinite confinement. This proposal
also includes the suggestion that, after verdict,
judges be replaced by psychiatrists. Attention is
tion. See PLANCK, VoU WESEN DER IVILLENSFREIMEIT
(1939). See also KAUSALGESETZ UND VILLENSFREnTEIT
45-47 (1923).
74 I do not mean to imply that such experience is
proof of the existence of free will in a Jamesian sense.
7 See, e.g., BRENNER, op. Cit. supra, note 43, 11-24.
78 Ferri, a leading determinist, thus found himself
in a peculiar dilemma which he resolved by performing
a "Kantian" switch from the realm of causation to that
of moral law. He said: "A man who violates the criminal
law may be examined as a delinquent (uono delin-
quente) as regards his anti-social conduct (criminal
psychology), as an accused as regards his conduct in
the course of procedure (judicial psychology), and as a
convict as regards his conduct in prison (prison psy-
chology). But as regards the legal crime, and as his
author, man must be studied as a subject of rights
(individual or collective)." FERRi, PRiNciPn DI DnUITTO
cRimnIALE 396-397 (1928). Life in society, he con-
cluded, imposes an obligation of a minimum social
discipline. Supra, at 398. He failed to explain what an
"obligation" means when a man cannot possibly
perform it. The idea of "social necessity" to which
he eventually resorted is itself a legal concept-a
reflection of the "state of necessity" known in penal
law.
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invited to the fact that the proposal does not
completely exclude the law and its processes, for it
requires the subjects of treatment or confinement
to be selected on the basis of conviction of a crime,
although as soon as such conviction is pronounced
it is to be completely disregarded, neither treat-
ment nor period of detention being affected by
the gravity of the crime. That crime has at best
symptomatic value, but other symptoms may be
equally or even more pertinent to the ultimate dis-
position. It would seem that the ritual of convic-
tion must serve some purpose. This purpose is
hardly preservation of the constitutional require-
ment of jury trial alone. It is, rather, avoidance
of drawing the ultimate logical inference from the
rationale of the proposal, that is, discarding the
requisite of crime and dividing the population
into classes in accordance with psychiatric stand-
ards of disposition. Those who admit such solution
to be unacceptable in a free society ought to
realize that it is only one step removed from
indefinite confinement when the precipitating crime
is a minor one. The scope of this essay does not
permit elaborate discussion of all constitutional
grounds of objection against such scheme.
DEFINING CEMINAL CONDUCT
Regrettably, no comprehensive reassessment of
the present system of substantive criminal law
in the light of psychoanalytic insight has as yet
been undertaken. Many psychoanalytic findings
can be fruitfully used in an attempt at a critical
evaluation of conventional crime types.
Psychoanalysis has substantiated the Biblical
finding that no man is immune against evil
thoughts. It has thus lent added support to the
principle that intent alone is not punishable.
Moreover, psychoanalysis has described in
dramatic fashion the struggle of contradictory
forces within man's mind for supremacy over his
actions. It has shown how forces of the Uncon-
scious opposed to man's conscious intent to commit
crime may express themselves in the external
7 Notice that the recommendation of the American
Psychiatric Association, 1927, for "permanent legal
detention of the incurably inadequate, incompetent,
and anti-social offenders irrespective of the particular
offense committed" (see Menninger, Medico-legal Pro-
posals of the American Psychiatric Association, 19 J.
CRr. L. & CRHIJNOLOGY 367, 376 (1928)) is not
accompanied by specification of the meaning of these
terms. Hakeem, op. cit. supra, note 11, at 650, notes:
"Not one of the terms used in this grim scheme was
defined."
world of action, frustrating its effectiveness. Thus,
as the consequences of man's acts are seldom
wholly unrelated to his mental processes, neither
is failure of intended consequences in most cases
entirely "accidental." Frustration of an "intended"
act appears to shed doubt on the integrity of the
intentY5 This finding renders the doctrine of
attempt, which in its present form dearly aims at
intent without even potential social harm, highly
dubiousY9 Attempt should accordingly be punish-
able only in those instances in which frustration of
the result was clearly due to circumstances over
which the actor had neither conscious nor uncon-
scious control. 0 Unless intervention of a "true
accident" is established, the actor should at best
incur a measure of education or a fine. By the
same token, the other so-called "inchoate crimes,"
solicitation and conspiracy, which share with
attempt the feature that the act falls short of that
8 On this see Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law,
106 U. PA. L. Rnv. 773, 797-799 (1958).
On subjectivism in the law of attempt see Ryu,
Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N. Y. U. L. REv.
1170, 1187-1188 (1957).
Commenting upon Besson's Case, decided by the
French Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Aug. 8, 1947
[1948] Dalloz Jurisprudence 293, which held an in-
formation of homicide sufficient to support a conviction
for attempted homicide, Donnedieu de Vabres, in a
note to the case in Dalloz Jurisprudence 293-296
(1948), said (at 295): "The attempt of any crime is
but a particular aspect of that crime; indeed, it is that
crime itself, which is commenced, planned, but whose
completion is prevented by an accidental circumstance
which hindered the will of the offender from pursuing
[his intent] until the end of the consequences of the
action." This suggests that in attempt, it is mostly
"the intent" that is obstructed. In some countries
attempt is punishable as severely as the completed
crime (e. g., Art. 3, French Penal Code), in others it
may be punished milder than the consummated crime
(Section 44, German Penal Code). GLANvILLE WIf-
LIAmS, CRnINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 109
(1953), states that "the objects of incapacitation and
reform would admit of no distinction [between attempt
and the consummated crime] being made, for the danger
is the same where the criminal's failure to complete
is due to chance." However, psychoanalysis shows that
in most cases that which is traditionally believed to
be "chance" is an unconsciously caused failure of
intent, so that the actor who failed to consummate the
crime is at least less dangerous than the successful
actor.
80To use a phrase of BRNNER, op. cit. supra,
note 43, at 151, "Insofar as a foreseeable mishap
[in the context of the text, a happy event-the avoid-
ance of a criminal result] is caused by a 'human im-
perfection' in the performance of some action or other,
we assume that it was unconsciously intended by the
performer of that action." In the case of the frustrated




contemplated by the accused, appear ques-
tionable.8
The ground for punishing conspiracy apart
from and often in addition to the punishment of
the act which is its object lies in the increased
social danger when several persons participate in
a criminal scheme. This feature is present in all
instances of "participation in crime," instigation,
aiding and abetting. Yet, in the latter instances,
the punitive scheme of the criminal law takes
account of the unity of purpose of the several
participants in a limitative rather than extensive
manner. It makes criminality-sometimes prosecu-
tion, punishment and conviction-of the
accomplice dependent on criminality-prosecution,
punishment and conviction-of the principal.
This dependence of the accomplice's criminality
on that of the principal has been adequately de-
scribed in French doctrine as "borrowed crimi-
nality."8 2 The notion of "borrowed criminality"
has been traced to ancient myths relating trans-
mission of moral taint to inanimate objects as
well as to men, a taint which must be washed off
by adjudging and destroying the affected thing
or by punishing the contaminated person.u The
most moderate expression of the spirit of "bor-
rowed criminality" in modern law is the German
rule which, though no longer requiring the crime
of the accomplice to be of the same type as that of
the principal,84 still predicates criminality of the
81 As stated by Justice Jackson, concurring in
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 445, at
450 (1949), "The doctrine [of conspiracy] does not
commend itself to jurists of civil-law countries, despite
universal recognition that an organized society must
have legal weapons for combatting organized crim-
inality." The Italian Penal Code (1930), art. 115(1),
specifically provides for the impunity of the mere
fact of agreement to commit crime. However, under
art. 115(2), in the case of an agreement to commit a
felony, the judge may apply a security measure. Such
measure is supervised liberty. Art. 229, It. Penal Code.
On this see BEmOL, DnuTTo PENALE 441 (Third
rev. ed. 1955).
82 Vouin ET LEAUTA, DROlT PENAL ET CRIINOLOGIE
283-284 (1956).
83 Ibid.
84 See Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in Criminal
Matters (German Federal Republic) (V. Strafsenat),
November 12, 1957, reported in 11 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 69 (1958), holding that an accomplice
could be convicted of aiding and abetting fraud (since
this was what he intended to do) even though the
principals had committed blackmail. Contrast with
this approach the French law's literal interpretation
of "borrowed criminality," which results in the follow-
ing paradoxical situation: If A instigates B to kill
B's father, A is punishable for parricide, although the
victim is not his father; but if A instigates B to kill
A's father, who is not also the father of B, neither A
accomplice upon the presence of criminal intent
in the principal's mind.8 5 "Borrowed criminality"
today is based on a primitive "sociologic" notion
of crime. Crime committed by several persons is
apparently viewed as a direct product of the
specific relationship between them. The "intent"
in such crimes seems to be conceived of as an
"inter-personal," "supra-individual" psychological
entity. Psychoanalysis rejects this, as well as any
other primarily sociologic, interpretation of crime.
In its view, crime results from each actor's own
psychological history and total personality de-
velopment rather than from a direct impact of
specific environmental social causation. Crimi-
nality is thus always ultimately centered in the
individual. It follows from this psychoanalytic
view of crime that each participant in crime should
be responsible for his own intent, regardless of
whether anyone else possessed intent, and for the
share which he had in bringing about the criminal
result.
On the other hand, psychoanalysis suggests the
possibility of unconscious participation in crime.
Of course, the law cannot intervene as regards the
person participating unconsciously; however, it
may and increasingly does take account of the
phenomenon of unconscious participation within
the scope of mitigating circumstances, particularly
where the person who unconsciously instigates or
aids the actor is the victim of the crime or a person
on whom the actor is dependent.
8 6
Psychoanalysis may also shed new light on the
legal doctrine of consent in those instances in which
"consent" eliminates the criminality of an act. A
special situation may arise in the relationship
between a psychiatrist and his patient. An inter-
vention into the bodily integrity of a patient is an
assault unless he consents. Where he is mentally
ill and thus legally incapable of giving consent, his
relatives usually supply the necessary consent;
for example, they consent to application of
nor B is punishable for parricide, but both are punish-
able for simple murder. See VouIN ET LEAUTP, op.
cit., supra, note 82, at 282.
85 See Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in Criminal
Matters (III. Strafsenat), July 6, 1956, reported in
10 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 29 (1957).
86 Thus, the Swiss Federal Penal Code (1937),
Art. 64, enumerates among the mitigating circumstances
the actor's having been induced to commit the crime
by a person "to whom he owes obedience or on whom
he is dependent" and his having been "seriously
tempted by the conduct of the injured person."
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electro-shocks.P The knowledge we now possess of
the hidden aggressions that exist precisely among
family members should disqualify relatives from
thus deciding upon the fate of a patient.8 In cases
of mental patients, electro-shocks as well as any
other serious interventions should be permissible
only upon the authority of a special court order
after an adversary hearing in which the patient
is represented by a public defender of the rights
and interests of the mentally ill.
As regards specific crimes, only particularly in-
structive examples of the potential spheres of
psychoanalytic impact may be noted in this essay.
Perhaps the most effective demonstration of
contemporary man's unconscious memory of an
original father murder and of the presence of an
Oedipus complex in the mind of every man,
whether judge or public, is the twentieth century
scene of a parricide led to the place of execution
barefeet, clad only in a shirt, a black veil covering
his face. On reading this description of the law
of parricide, one would assume that it refers to the
law of the Trobriand Islanders. It may be instruc-
tive to learn that it is the law of one of the most
civilized, sophisticated and enlightened nations of
the world, France." Psychoanalytic insight justifies
elimination of parricide as a distinctive crime. -°
87Prominent psychiatrists have expressed the view
that such treatment may permanently damage the
mental functions of the patient. See Guttmacher,
supra, note 8, at 633. Concern with the possibility of
abuse of the device is expressed in Shock Therapy,
Report No. 1 of the Group for Advancement of Psy-
chiatry, September 15, 1947. See also Revised Electro-
Shock Therapy Report, Report No. 15, August 1950,
showing somewhat less concern; but see par. 9, letter a,
at p. 2: "The mode of action of electro-shock therapy
... is unknown."
81An interesting malpractice case in which a wife's
consent to application of shock-therapy to the hus-
band was collaterally in issue is Lester v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957).9 Art. 13, French Penal Code.
90 In France, parricide is punished capitally (Art.
302, Penal Code), whereas simple murder is punished
by life imprisonment with forced labor. The special
crime of parricide was abolished in Germany in 1941.
Law of Sept. 4, 1941 (R.G.BI. I S. 549).
Psychoanalysis, which in its formative years
had been branded as "all quackery and pornog-
raphy"' because it had dared to discuss sex
scientifically and dispassionately, has been since
remarkably successful in bringing enlightenment
on the subject to the general public. But it has
reached only a very limited audience when it has
attempted to make the sex offender better under-
stood. Sex offenders are special targets of prejudice,
because their crimes are particularly apt to call
forth in the minds of judges and the public their
own infantile experiences, forbidden wishes and
guilt feelings. Even convicted burglars tend to
despise their fellow prisoners of the homosexual
type.9- Psychoanalysis has shown that many sex
offenders are not simply wicked but are rather
victims of neurotic impulses which they are unable
to control.
The impact of the reform movement originated
in this area is as yet uncertain. There is, on the
one hand, a tendency to eliminate from the list of
crimes deviations which are expressed in conduct
not socially harmful, to grade other conduct in
accordance with the degree of its actual harmful-
ness, and to treat rather than punish the offender,
and, on the other hand, a highly questionable
trend toward protection of society often against
minor and uncertain danger at the expense of in-
dividual liberty and due process.9'
As a lawyer inspired by the stimulus afforded to
legal thinking by the psychoanalytic movement, I
should like to conclude on a note of hope that the
law may, within the limits of due process and the
needs of protecting men's freedom, equality and
dignity, utilize to the fullest extent the teachings
of psychoanalytic psychology.
91 GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE CRumE OF Im-
PRISONMtENT 47 (Philosophical Library New York
1946) thus expressed the public view of psychoanalysis.
92H. MANH~fra, CIIINmL JusTIcE AND SOCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION 65 (1946).
93 On the problem of sex offenses see particularly
B. KrARuN, op. cit. supra, note 13.
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